华中科技大学学报(社会科学版)
華中科技大學學報(社會科學版)
화중과기대학학보(사회과학판)
Journal of Huazhong University of Science and Technology (Social Science Edition)
2015年
6期
92-104
,共13页
高管权力%外部薪酬差距%业绩预告行为
高管權力%外部薪酬差距%業績預告行為
고관권력%외부신수차거%업적예고행위
chief executive power%external compensation dispersion%earnings forecast behavior
本文研究我国上市公司高管权力、外部薪酬差距对公司业绩预告行为的影响。研究发现,外部薪酬差距对公司业绩预告行为的影响基本上呈倒“U”形关系:在一定界限内对公司业绩预告行为具有激励效应,随着外部薪酬差距的增大,业绩预告信息质量提高,及时性增强,其决策有用性提高,体现为高管协同动机;超过一定界限,则具有反激励效应,随着外部薪酬差距的增大,业绩预告信息质量降低,及时性减弱,倾向性趋于保守,其决策有用性降低,体现为高管自利动机;没有证据表明高管权力影响外部薪酬差距对公司业绩预告行为的效应。进一步研究发现,随着在职消费的增大,在职消费对公司业绩预告行为的影响基本上呈倒“U”形关系。本文研究丰富了公司业绩预告行为的影响因素研究,为高管激励对公司信息披露的影响提供了新的经验证据。
本文研究我國上市公司高管權力、外部薪酬差距對公司業績預告行為的影響。研究髮現,外部薪酬差距對公司業績預告行為的影響基本上呈倒“U”形關繫:在一定界限內對公司業績預告行為具有激勵效應,隨著外部薪酬差距的增大,業績預告信息質量提高,及時性增彊,其決策有用性提高,體現為高管協同動機;超過一定界限,則具有反激勵效應,隨著外部薪酬差距的增大,業績預告信息質量降低,及時性減弱,傾嚮性趨于保守,其決策有用性降低,體現為高管自利動機;沒有證據錶明高管權力影響外部薪酬差距對公司業績預告行為的效應。進一步研究髮現,隨著在職消費的增大,在職消費對公司業績預告行為的影響基本上呈倒“U”形關繫。本文研究豐富瞭公司業績預告行為的影響因素研究,為高管激勵對公司信息披露的影響提供瞭新的經驗證據。
본문연구아국상시공사고관권력、외부신수차거대공사업적예고행위적영향。연구발현,외부신수차거대공사업적예고행위적영향기본상정도“U”형관계:재일정계한내대공사업적예고행위구유격려효응,수착외부신수차거적증대,업적예고신식질량제고,급시성증강,기결책유용성제고,체현위고관협동동궤;초과일정계한,칙구유반격려효응,수착외부신수차거적증대,업적예고신식질량강저,급시성감약,경향성추우보수,기결책유용성강저,체현위고관자리동궤;몰유증거표명고관권력영향외부신수차거대공사업적예고행위적효응。진일보연구발현,수착재직소비적증대,재직소비대공사업적예고행위적영향기본상정도“U”형관계。본문연구봉부료공사업적예고행위적영향인소연구,위고관격려대공사신식피로적영향제공료신적경험증거。
This paper investigates the effect of chief executive power, external compensation dispersion on corporate earnings forecast behavior.The research evidence shows that the influence of ex-ternal compensation dispersion on corporate earnings forecast behavior is basically an inverse“U” shape rela-tionship:external compensation dispersion has incentive effect on corporate earnings forecast behavior before it reaches a cut point.With the increase of the external compensation dispersion, earnings forecast information quality and timeliness can be significantly improved.The decision usefulness of earnings forecast information is enhanced, which reflected the executive’ s synergy motive.After this cut point, external compensation disper-sion has reverse incentive effect on corporate earnings forecast behavior.With the increase of the external com-pensation dispersion, earnings forecast information quality and timeliness can be significantly reduced, and tendency tends to be conservative, the decision usefulness of earnings forecast information is weakened, which reflected the executives self motive.The existence of chief executive power does not affect the effect of external compensation dispersion to corporate earnings forecast behavior.Further analysis shows that with the increase of perks, the influence of perks on corporate earnings forecast behavior is basically an inverse“U” shape rela-tionship.These results may enrich the determinants studies on corporate earnings forecast behavior, and pro-vide some new empirical evidence on the influence of executive incentive on company information disclosure.