CAJ | 학술논문

针对一些应急物资，采用政府企业联合储备方式储备，可以降低政府储备成本，企业也可以从中获益。本文研究政企联合实物储备的合作机理，分析了联盟参与人之间的博弈关系，建立了联盟收益模型，运用shapley值解决合作的联盟收益分配问题，最后分析了联盟的稳定性。算例分析显示在政企合作联盟中政府和企业关系类似“地主”和“农民”的关系，当企业获得的收益小于其机会成本时，企业不愿意加入联盟，这时政府需对企业进行交叉补贴来维持联盟稳定。缺货成本低于政府储备成本时，政府会考虑与企业联合储备或者选择缺货；缺货成本低于企业储备成本时，政府选择缺货。
침대일사응급물자，채용정부기업연합저비방식저비，가이강저정부저비성본，기업야가이종중획익。본문연구정기연합실물저비적합작궤리，분석료련맹삼여인지간적박혁관계，건립료련맹수익모형，운용shapley치해결합작적련맹수익분배문제，최후분석료련맹적은정성。산례분석현시재정기합작련맹중정부화기업관계유사“지주”화“농민”적관계，당기업획득적수익소우기궤회성본시，기업불원의가입련맹，저시정부수대기업진행교차보첩래유지련맹은정。결화성본저우정부저비성본시，정부회고필여기업연합저비혹자선택결화；결화성본저우기업저비성본시，정부선택결화。
For some kind of emergency supplies, the joint of government and enterprises can reduce the cost of government, and the enterprises can also benefit from it.This paper studies the mechanism of cooperation be-tween government and enterprises in emergency supplies reserve.First it analyses the game between the alliance participants;then it uses the shapley value to solve the revenue distribution problem in the alliance;finally it an-alyses the stability of the alliance.The example analysis shows that the relationship between the government and enterprises in the alliance is similar to the relationship between“landlords” and“peasants”;the enterprises are reluctant to join the alliance when the earnings they gain are less than their opportunity cost, the government needs to cross-subsidize enterprises to maintain the stability of the alliance.When the shortage cost is less than the cost of government reserve, the government will choose shortage or join with the enterprises.When the short-age cost is less than the cost of enterprise reserve, the government will choose shortage.