运筹与管理
運籌與管理
운주여관리
Operations Research and Management Science
2015年
5期
206-213
,共8页
工艺创新强度决策%市场绩效%合作博弈%买方抗衡势力%两部收费制
工藝創新彊度決策%市場績效%閤作博弈%買方抗衡勢力%兩部收費製
공예창신강도결책%시장적효%합작박혁%매방항형세력%량부수비제
the decision of process innovation intensity%market performance%cooperative game%countervailing power%two-part tariff
设计了由一个上游企业和两个下游企业所构成的产业链纵向关系模型,建立了纵向一体化、纵向分离且下游企业均无买方抗衡势力、以及单个下游企业具有买方抗衡势力三种情况下上游企业的工艺创新强度计算模型,分析了下游企业存在买方抗衡势力时市场中均衡的批发价格、零售价格、企业利润以及社会福利的变化,给出了相应的结论,同时也说明了“加尔布雷斯假说”在本文的结构下没有得到验证。
設計瞭由一箇上遊企業和兩箇下遊企業所構成的產業鏈縱嚮關繫模型,建立瞭縱嚮一體化、縱嚮分離且下遊企業均無買方抗衡勢力、以及單箇下遊企業具有買方抗衡勢力三種情況下上遊企業的工藝創新彊度計算模型,分析瞭下遊企業存在買方抗衡勢力時市場中均衡的批髮價格、零售價格、企業利潤以及社會福利的變化,給齣瞭相應的結論,同時也說明瞭“加爾佈雷斯假說”在本文的結構下沒有得到驗證。
설계료유일개상유기업화량개하유기업소구성적산업련종향관계모형,건립료종향일체화、종향분리차하유기업균무매방항형세력、이급단개하유기업구유매방항형세력삼충정황하상유기업적공예창신강도계산모형,분석료하유기업존재매방항형세력시시장중균형적비발개격、령수개격、기업리윤이급사회복리적변화,급출료상응적결론,동시야설명료“가이포뢰사가설”재본문적결구하몰유득도험증。
We consider a vertical relationship model which consists of an upstream firm and two downstream firms, and construct calculation models of upstream firm’ s process innovation intensity in three different situa-tions-vertical integration, vertical separation in which neither downstream has countervailing power, vertical separation in which only one downstream has countervailing power.By doing these, we analyse the changes of wholesale prices, retail prices, profits and social welfare in equilibrium and get corresponding conclusions, and we also show that“Galbraith hypothesis” has not been verified in the structure of this paper.