CAJ | 학술논문

由于信息不对称，供应商和制造商之间的信息分享和信任决策是供应链协调的关键。为了获得充足供给，制造商分享其私有需求信息，但同时存在欺骗动机；鉴于制造商的信息分享，供应商进行信任决策和产能投资。本文通过构建服务价值模型，分析了供应商与制造商之间的服务关系对信息分享和信任决策的影响。研究结果表明如果供应商的服务价值足够高，制造商会选择真实分享信息，此时供应商可以充分信任制造商的信息；如果服务价值低，制造商会采取放大需求信息的欺骗行为，此时供应商应怀疑制造商所分享信息的真实性。
유우신식불대칭，공응상화제조상지간적신식분향화신임결책시공응련협조적관건。위료획득충족공급，제조상분향기사유수구신식，단동시존재기편동궤；감우제조상적신식분향，공응상진행신임결책화산능투자。본문통과구건복무개치모형，분석료공응상여제조상지간적복무관계대신식분향화신임결책적영향。연구결과표명여과공응상적복무개치족구고，제조상회선택진실분향신식，차시공응상가이충분신임제조상적신식；여과복무개치저，제조상회채취방대수구신식적기편행위，차시공응상응부의제조상소분향신식적진실성。
Based on asymmetric information between supplier and manufacturer, information sharing and trust decision are the key to supplying chain coordination.To ensure adequate supply, the manufacturer shares private demand information with the supplier, but does so with a cheating motivation.In view of the manufacturer's infor-mation sharing, the supplier determines capacity investment and makes trust decision.Our study shows that low deceive cost will cause the untruthful manufacturer information sharing .On the establishment of the service value model, we analyze how the service relationship affects information sharing and trust decision.The results show that if service value is high enough, the value of services will enable manufacturers to share information truly, and the supplier can fully trust the manufacturer information sharing.If the service value is, the manufacturer will have an incentive to inflate private information in a costless communication.So the supplier should doubt manufacturers’ information sharing.