CAJ | 학술논문

通过梳理1985—2012年我国政府颁布的职务消费管制政策，并分析每项管制政策的侧重对象及内容条款，采用政策赋分法度量职务消费管制程度，在此基础上以2009—2012年沪市国有上市公司为样本，实证检验职务消费管制程度与国有企业管理层在职消费的关系。研究发现，管理层在职消费水平随着职务消费管制程度的增强而降低，表明政府颁布的职务消费管制政策能对国有企业管理层的在职消费产生抑制作用。建议政府部门进一步加大职务消费管制力度，以严控国有企业管理层在职消费行为。
통과소리1985—2012년아국정부반포적직무소비관제정책，병분석매항관제정책적측중대상급내용조관，채용정책부분법도량직무소비관제정도，재차기출상이2009—2012년호시국유상시공사위양본，실증검험직무소비관제정도여국유기업관리층재직소비적관계。연구발현，관리층재직소비수평수착직무소비관제정도적증강이강저，표명정부반포적직무소비관제정책능대국유기업관리층적재직소비산생억제작용。건의정부부문진일보가대직무소비관제력도，이엄공국유기업관리층재직소비행위。
This paper arranges perks regulation policies from 1985 to 2012 in China,and then specifically analyses the contents of every regulation policy and gives corresponding scores to measure perks regulation degree.Based on the above,the author empirically tests the relationship between perks regulation and executive perks by using the samples of 2009—2012 state-owned enterprises(SOE)in Shanghai Stock Exchange.It is found that executive perks level decreases along with the strengthening of perks regulation degree.It shows that the perks regulation policy can inhibit executive perks in SOE.