CAJ | 학술논문

学界普遍将低保执行中的“关系保”和“人情保”等政策变异视为在后税费时代的乡村治理手段。在鲁中 C 镇农村低保执行的个案中深度阐述了另一种类型的变异：村干部通过提示促使低保户在获得低保名额的同时，需要上交一部分低保金作为交换条件。低保自身的制度缺陷为此种合谋行为的产生提供了可能性。村干部通过建立庇护制来对村民进行操作，村民在此基础上通过理性博弈，进而选择上交的策略让自己适当获利，最终形成了双方的合谋。通过对当今的庇护制与集体化时期的庇护制进行比较，指出低保公示制度有利于消解“合谋”行为的发生。
학계보편장저보집행중적“관계보”화“인정보”등정책변이시위재후세비시대적향촌치리수단。재로중 C 진농촌저보집행적개안중심도천술료령일충류형적변이：촌간부통과제시촉사저보호재획득저보명액적동시，수요상교일부분저보금작위교환조건。저보자신적제도결함위차충합모행위적산생제공료가능성。촌간부통과건립비호제래대촌민진행조작，촌민재차기출상통과이성박혁，진이선택상교적책략양자기괄당획리，최종형성료쌍방적합모。통과대당금적비호제여집체화시기적비호제진행비교，지출저보공시제도유리우소해“합모”행위적발생。
GuanxiBao and RenqingBao in implementing rural subsistence allowances are viewed as rural governance tolls by most scholars after the tax reform.However, another sort of policy implementation variation is revealed through the case study of rural subsistence allowances in C Town,Shandong Province,where many village cadres tend to prompt the low-income families that if they want to receive subsistence allowances from the government they should return some subsidies to the cadres as an exchange reward.The inherent defect of subsistence allowances offers the possibility of such collusion.By establishing the patron system,village cadres can easily manipulate the low-income recipients.In turn,villagers can also game and choose a preferred delivery strategy for more profit.As a result the two sides may reach collusion.Finally,the current patron system and that in the collectivization period is compared,which indicates that the subsistence allowance publicity system helps to resolve the emergence of collusion.