CAJ | 학술논문

经过演化博弈研究发现，银行助学贷款发放成本越高，高校选择配合催收的概率越大；在风险补偿机制启动阈值较高、高校承担的风险补偿金比例低的情况下，高校配合催收的实际效果会比较差。因此，为降低国家助学贷款的违约风险，应给予经办银行向上调整助学贷款利息率的权限，尽量使每个经办银行形成助学贷款的规模效应。同时，提高贷款违约率高的学校管理助学贷款的成本，推动经办银行对出现多期违约的毕业生采取相关的法律追讨措施，共同做好国家助学贷款的违约风险管理。
경과연화박혁연구발현，은행조학대관발방성본월고，고교선택배합최수적개솔월대；재풍험보상궤제계동역치교고、고교승담적풍험보상금비례저적정황하，고교배합최수적실제효과회비교차。인차，위강저국가조학대관적위약풍험，응급여경판은행향상조정조학대관이식솔적권한，진량사매개경판은행형성조학대관적규모효응。동시，제고대관위약솔고적학교관리조학대관적성본，추동경판은행대출현다기위약적필업생채취상관적법률추토조시，공동주호국가조학대관적위약풍험관리。
Based on the evolutionary game theory,a model was built to explore the strategy selection of higher education institutions and banks in the risk management of national student loans.It was found that the higher the cost of student loans is, the more likely higher education institutions will take cooperative measures.The actual effect of default loan collection implemented by higher education institutions will be relatively poor in the condition that the starting threshold value of risk compensation mechanisms is bigger and the management responsibility of higher education institutions is comparatively small.Therefore,to reduce the default risk of national student loans,banks should be given permission to raise the interest of student loans,and each administering bank should offer sizable student loans. Meanwhile,the cost of student loan management should be increased among the institutions whose graduates have higher default rates,and the issuing banks of national student loans should be urged to take legal actions at those who have multi-period defaults in order to improve the default risk management of national student loans.