CAJ | 학술논문

应用博弈论中的完全信息静态博弈模型研究农产品质量安全监管问题,通过分析农产品检测人员和农产品供应人员的具体行为得到混合策略下的纳什均衡点, 得出了在考虑检查成本时检测人员抽检农产品的概率与供应人员供应合格的农产品概率之间的关系. 研究表明,经济博弈方对收入、成本和罚款的预期是决定两者策略选择的重要因素,并提出提高农产品质量的措施.
응용박혁론중적완전신식정태박혁모형연구농산품질량안전감관문제,통과분석농산품검측인원화농산품공응인원적구체행위득도혼합책략하적납십균형점, 득출료재고필검사성본시검측인원추검농산품적개솔여공응인원공응합격적농산품개솔지간적관계. 연구표명,경제박혁방대수입、성본화벌관적예기시결정량자책략선택적중요인소,병제출제고농산품질량적조시.
By using the complete information static game, the quality-safety surveillance of agricultural products was studied, and the Nash equilibrium under the mixed strategy was grasped by analyzing the behavior of the inspectors and suppliers of agricultural products. The relationship between possibility of inspectors' sampling agricultural products and possibility of suppli-ers' qualifying agricultural products under considering the check cost was found out. The research showed that, the expecta-tion for income, cost and fine are crucial for both game parties when they choose the strategy. Finally some countermeasures to improve the quality of agricultural products were proposed.