西部论坛
西部論罈
서부론단
Journal of Chongqing Technology and Business University (West Forum)
2015年
6期
77-89
,共13页
公司治理%内部监督模式%“双头”监督模式%独立董事%监事会%公司风险%治理效率%制度竞争红利%治理职能冲突
公司治理%內部鑑督模式%“雙頭”鑑督模式%獨立董事%鑑事會%公司風險%治理效率%製度競爭紅利%治理職能遲突
공사치리%내부감독모식%“쌍두”감독모식%독립동사%감사회%공사풍험%치리효솔%제도경쟁홍리%치리직능충돌
company management%internal supervisory patterns%“double”supervising model%independent directors%board of supervisors%corporate risk%governance effect%institutional competition dividend%management duty conflict
以公司风险为切入点，以1999—2012年我国2375家上市公司19469个年度观测值为研究样本，检验独立董事和监事会的治理效率，并通过交互效应考察二者之间的关系，研究发现：（1）导入独立董事制度前监事会治理效率微弱，导入独立董事制度后监事会治理效率有了明显改善，说明从国家宏观层面看，引入独立董事制度，增加了治理监督的制度供给，优化了制度结构，获得了制度竞争带来的红利。（2）勤勉履职的独立董事有利于降低公司风险，表明在我国公司治理结构中设立独立董事具有经济合理性。（3）独立董事和监事会两者之间是一种替代关系，而非互补关系，说明从公司微观层面看，独立董事和监事会存在职能冲突，并不利于降低公司风险。采用独立董事和监事会“双头”监督模式难以从根本解决我国上市公司治理监督的有效性问题，最佳的选择是，允许独立董事制度和监事会制度同时并存、共同竞争，许可公司根据自身情况选择合适的内部监督模式。
以公司風險為切入點，以1999—2012年我國2375傢上市公司19469箇年度觀測值為研究樣本，檢驗獨立董事和鑑事會的治理效率，併通過交互效應攷察二者之間的關繫，研究髮現：（1）導入獨立董事製度前鑑事會治理效率微弱，導入獨立董事製度後鑑事會治理效率有瞭明顯改善，說明從國傢宏觀層麵看，引入獨立董事製度，增加瞭治理鑑督的製度供給，優化瞭製度結構，穫得瞭製度競爭帶來的紅利。（2）勤勉履職的獨立董事有利于降低公司風險，錶明在我國公司治理結構中設立獨立董事具有經濟閤理性。（3）獨立董事和鑑事會兩者之間是一種替代關繫，而非互補關繫，說明從公司微觀層麵看，獨立董事和鑑事會存在職能遲突，併不利于降低公司風險。採用獨立董事和鑑事會“雙頭”鑑督模式難以從根本解決我國上市公司治理鑑督的有效性問題，最佳的選擇是，允許獨立董事製度和鑑事會製度同時併存、共同競爭，許可公司根據自身情況選擇閤適的內部鑑督模式。
이공사풍험위절입점，이1999—2012년아국2375가상시공사19469개년도관측치위연구양본，검험독립동사화감사회적치리효솔，병통과교호효응고찰이자지간적관계，연구발현：（1）도입독립동사제도전감사회치리효솔미약，도입독립동사제도후감사회치리효솔유료명현개선，설명종국가굉관층면간，인입독립동사제도，증가료치리감독적제도공급，우화료제도결구，획득료제도경쟁대래적홍리。（2）근면리직적독립동사유리우강저공사풍험，표명재아국공사치리결구중설립독립동사구유경제합이성。（3）독립동사화감사회량자지간시일충체대관계，이비호보관계，설명종공사미관층면간，독립동사화감사회존재직능충돌，병불리우강저공사풍험。채용독립동사화감사회“쌍두”감독모식난이종근본해결아국상시공사치리감독적유효성문제，최가적선택시，윤허독립동사제도화감사회제도동시병존、공동경쟁，허가공사근거자신정황선택합괄적내부감독모식。
By using the business risk as the breakthrough point,by taking 19469 yearly observation values of 2375 listed companies of China during 1999-2012 as research sample,this paper empirically tests the governance efficiency and their interaction of the supervisory board and independent directors.The research shows:(1)that the governance efficiency of the supervisory boards has been improved after introducing the independent director system,while it was weak before,which indicates that from national macro-level,the introduction of independent directors increases systematic supply of management and supervision,optimizes institutional structure and obtains the dividend brought by system competition;(2)that industrious independent directors significantly reduce the business risk,which shows that the establishment of independent directors in China’s company management structure has economic rationality;(3)and that it is a kind of substitutional relation rather than complementary relationship between independent directors and the board of supervisors,which reveals that from micro-level of a company,there is duty conflict between independent directors and board of supervisors and that under the arrangement of the initial institution of the board of supervisors,the introduction of the independent directors will weaken the supervising effect of the board of supervisors.The use of double supervision model by independent directors and the board of supervisors is difficult to solve the effectiveness of management supervision of China’s listed companies and the optimal selection for listed companies is to permit them co-existence and competition and to permit the listed companies to choose their appropriate internal supervision pattern according to their own situation.
