技术经济与管理研究
技術經濟與管理研究
기술경제여관리연구
Technoeconomics & Management Research
2015年
12期
8-15
,共8页
预算约束%拍卖%VCG机制%预算阈值
預算約束%拍賣%VCG機製%預算閾值
예산약속%박매%VCG궤제%예산역치
Budget-constrained%Keyword auctions%VCG mechanism%Budget thresholds
文章研究了带有预算约束的基于VCG机制关键词拍卖问题。之前学者的研究一般不考虑预算约束的情况，但是广告主在参与广告位竞价时，通常都会提前分配每天的预算。当广告主的支付价格达到他的预算时，就会退出此次拍卖。在VCG机制中，广告主的支付是由排位在他之后的广告主的点击率和报价的线性组合决定，所以广告主会调增报价来提高竞争对手的支付价格。文章借助带有预算约束的全局无嫉妒纳什均衡条件，给出达到均衡时的预算阈值。结果表明合理设置预算对于广告主降低成本和提高收益都有一定影响。
文章研究瞭帶有預算約束的基于VCG機製關鍵詞拍賣問題。之前學者的研究一般不攷慮預算約束的情況，但是廣告主在參與廣告位競價時，通常都會提前分配每天的預算。噹廣告主的支付價格達到他的預算時，就會退齣此次拍賣。在VCG機製中，廣告主的支付是由排位在他之後的廣告主的點擊率和報價的線性組閤決定，所以廣告主會調增報價來提高競爭對手的支付價格。文章藉助帶有預算約束的全跼無嫉妒納什均衡條件，給齣達到均衡時的預算閾值。結果錶明閤理設置預算對于廣告主降低成本和提高收益都有一定影響。
문장연구료대유예산약속적기우VCG궤제관건사박매문제。지전학자적연구일반불고필예산약속적정황，단시엄고주재삼여엄고위경개시，통상도회제전분배매천적예산。당엄고주적지부개격체도타적예산시，취회퇴출차차박매。재VCG궤제중，엄고주적지부시유배위재타지후적엄고주적점격솔화보개적선성조합결정，소이엄고주회조증보개래제고경쟁대수적지부개격。문장차조대유예산약속적전국무질투납십균형조건，급출체도균형시적예산역치。결과표명합리설치예산대우엄고주강저성본화제고수익도유일정영향。
The paper analyses the problem of keyword auctions based on VCG mechanism with budget constraint. Previous st-udies have generally not considered the budget constraint, but advertisers who are involved in the keyword auctions usually allocate a budget for each day in advance. When advertisers pay the price to reach his budget, he will withdraw from the auction. In the VCG mechanism, the advertiser's payment is determined by the linear combination of the click-through rate and the price of the advertisers below him in his position. With the aid of the globally envy-free Nash equilibrium conditions , we give the budget threshold to reach equilibrium. The result shows that the reasonable setting budget has certain effect on reducing cost and improving utility of advertiser.
