CAJ | 학술논문

文章以许可收入最大化为视角，构建了序贯创新条件下的累积互补性索偿权模型，研究专利联盟对企业序贯创新行为的影响问题。研究发现：专利联盟稳定存在时，随着联盟成员增多，专利联盟对企业序贯创新的激励作用逐渐减弱，但仍然高于仅有专利保护的情况；而专利联盟内生结构则要求为保持联盟稳定性需强制形成联盟，以实现激励作用；而在专利保护期限有限情况下，专利联盟对企业序贯创新的影响只与研发成本有关。最后给出了最优专利保护期限。
문장이허가수입최대화위시각，구건료서관창신조건하적루적호보성색상권모형，연구전리련맹대기업서관창신행위적영향문제。연구발현：전리련맹은정존재시，수착련맹성원증다，전리련맹대기업서관창신적격려작용축점감약，단잉연고우부유전리보호적정황；이전리련맹내생결구칙요구위보지련맹은정성수강제형성련맹，이실현격려작용；이재전리보호기한유한정황하，전리련맹대기업서관창신적영향지여연발성본유관。최후급출료최우전리보호기한。
This paper builds a model of complementary cumulative claims of unlimited length of patents based on the maximization of license revenue ,and studies the effect of patent alliance on the sequential innovation of the enterprise .It is shown that with the increasing of the member number of patent alli‐ance ,the possibility of innovation is reducing ,but still higher than the regimes of patents ;since the patent alliance structure is determined by endogenous factors ,it is necessary to force to form patent alliance to realize the motivation function ;and when the length of patents is limited ,the effect of pa‐tent alliance on the sequential innovation of the enterprise only depends on the R&D cost .T he perfect length is found .