CAJ | 학술논문

“节能惠民工程”消费直接补贴政策虽已退出市场，但所存在的“骗补”行为为该政策的重启蒙上了阴影，破解直补政策中的逆向选择问题是有效遏制“骗补”行为的根本路径。根据委托—代理理论，我国低碳消费直补政策相当于由政府、家电厂商和家电消费者三方缔结而成的激励规制合约，通过对其建立单一规制目标合约的优化模型并求解可知：厂商在参与合约的情况下可获得信息租金，而且厂商的逆向选择行为对政府最优规制没有影响，以及消费者低碳努力程度的上限受到操作者逆向选择行为的影响，这说明家电厂商在销量、产品节能水平甚至定价上存在显性隐蔽行为，并对政策的减排效应产生影响。
“절능혜민공정”소비직접보첩정책수이퇴출시장，단소존재적“편보”행위위해정책적중계몽상료음영，파해직보정책중적역향선택문제시유효알제“편보”행위적근본로경。근거위탁—대리이론，아국저탄소비직보정책상당우유정부、가전엄상화가전소비자삼방체결이성적격려규제합약，통과대기건립단일규제목표합약적우화모형병구해가지：엄상재삼여합약적정황하가획득신식조금，이차엄상적역향선택행위대정부최우규제몰유영향，이급소비자저탄노력정도적상한수도조작자역향선택행위적영향，저설명가전엄상재소량、산품절능수평심지정개상존재현성은폐행위，병대정책적감배효응산생영향。
The efficient project to benefit people as direct consumer subsidy policy , four years later , was stopped, but the subsidy swindles could overshadow renewing the policy , so to solve the Reverse Option is-sue of subsidy policy is the basic route can to effectively prevent the swindles .According to principal-agent theory , the policy amounted to the incentive regulation contract by low carbon consumers , government and enterprises .under ingle regulated target , if go through with the deal ,enterprises can gain information rent , their reverse options hadn ’ t any influence to government ’ s optimum regulation , but did it to consumers ’ best reduction effort , enterprises ’ actual sales , energy efficiency , price were hidden , which weaken the ef-ficient policy ’ s effect .