CAJ | 학술논문

针对重大工程关键部件供应商的合作问题,基于演化视角建立供应商的合作博弈模型,分析双方合作的影响因素,并进一步构建业主参与下的激励与惩罚机制,对其影响因素进行探讨. 研究结果表明,合作生产的超额收益与不合作时支付的租金的增加对双方合作有促进作用,合作投资成本与"搭便车"收益的增加则不利于博弈双方走向合作,投资成本的合理分担与业主参与下有效的激励和惩罚机制可以降低"搭便车"行为的产生,促进供应商间的合作.
침대중대공정관건부건공응상적합작문제,기우연화시각건립공응상적합작박혁모형,분석쌍방합작적영향인소,병진일보구건업주삼여하적격려여징벌궤제,대기영향인소진행탐토. 연구결과표명,합작생산적초액수익여불합작시지부적조금적증가대쌍방합작유촉진작용,합작투자성본여"탑편차"수익적증가칙불리우박혁쌍방주향합작,투자성본적합리분담여업주삼여하유효적격려화징벌궤제가이강저"탑편차"행위적산생,촉진공응상간적합작.
By the evolutionary game theory, this paper researched on the cooperation mechanism between key components sup-pliers in mega project, and analyzed the influence factors of bilateral cooperation, and then studied the impact of the incentive and punishment mechanism when the owner participated in. Result showed that, the probability of cooperation of both sides had a positive correlation with excess income of cooperation and the rent paid when non-collaboration, and a negative correla-tion with cost of investment and extra income obtained by free-rider behavior. Reasonable sharing of investment cost and the incentive and punishment mechanism can control the free-rider behavior and promote the cooperation between suppliers.