价值工程
價值工程
개치공정
VALUE ENGINEERING
2013年
33期
122-123,124
,共3页
非对称信息%混合博弈%中小企业%融资%均衡策略
非對稱信息%混閤博弈%中小企業%融資%均衡策略
비대칭신식%혼합박혁%중소기업%융자%균형책략
asymmetric information%mixed game%small-and-medium enterprises%financing%equilibrium strategy
根据融资次序理论，分析我国中小企业融资的主要途径来源于商业银行贷款。根据国内学者从三个视角研究我国中小企业融资问题，建立非对称信息下中小企业与商业银行的演化博弈模型，用数学方法论证了中小企业在一次性贷款状况下不还款的概率大的经济现象；通过非对称信息下混合策略的概率分析，提出了满足商业银行和中小企业的演化博弈混合策略模型理想博弈精炼Nash均衡的条件公式。
根據融資次序理論，分析我國中小企業融資的主要途徑來源于商業銀行貸款。根據國內學者從三箇視角研究我國中小企業融資問題，建立非對稱信息下中小企業與商業銀行的縯化博弈模型，用數學方法論證瞭中小企業在一次性貸款狀況下不還款的概率大的經濟現象；通過非對稱信息下混閤策略的概率分析，提齣瞭滿足商業銀行和中小企業的縯化博弈混閤策略模型理想博弈精煉Nash均衡的條件公式。
근거융자차서이론，분석아국중소기업융자적주요도경래원우상업은행대관。근거국내학자종삼개시각연구아국중소기업융자문제，건립비대칭신식하중소기업여상업은행적연화박혁모형，용수학방법론증료중소기업재일차성대관상황하불환관적개솔대적경제현상；통과비대칭신식하혼합책략적개솔분석，제출료만족상업은행화중소기업적연화박혁혼합책략모형이상박혁정련Nash균형적조건공식。
According to the financing order theory, this paper would analyze financing from the main way of commercial bank loan about the small-and-medium enterprises. According to the domestic scholars' study on financing problems from three perspectives, the evolutionary game model of small and medium-sized enterprises and commercial banks under the asymmetric information is established, and demonstrates that the probability of not reimbursement under the one-time loan conditions is big; through the analysis of asymmetric information under the probability of the hybrid strategy, it puts the condition formula of evolutionary game hybrid strategy model ideal game refining Nash balance.
