计算机工程与应用
計算機工程與應用
계산궤공정여응용
COMPUTER ENGINEERING AND APPLICATIONS
2013年
18期
89-93
,共5页
陈开颜%余浩%邹程%吴恒旭
陳開顏%餘浩%鄒程%吳恆旭
진개안%여호%추정%오항욱
密码芯片%近场%电磁辐射%差分电磁分析%高级加密标准%现场可编程门阵列
密碼芯片%近場%電磁輻射%差分電磁分析%高級加密標準%現場可編程門陣列
밀마심편%근장%전자복사%차분전자분석%고급가밀표준%현장가편정문진렬
cipher chip%near-field%Electromagnetic(EM)radiations%Differential ElectroMagnetic Analysis(DEMA)%Advanced Encryption Standard(AES)%Field Programmable Gate Arrays(FPGA)
为探究现场可编程门阵列(FPGA)密码芯片运行时电磁辐射造成的涉密信息泄漏情况,研究了互补金属氧化物半导体(CMOS)电路直接电磁辐射的原理,构建了FPGA密码芯片的近场电磁辐射模型。根据这个模型,探讨了近场电磁辐射测量点的选取,采用电磁扫描的方法解决了电磁探头在FPGA表面电磁信号采集的定位问题。此外,在阐释了差分电磁分析(DEMA)攻击原理的同时,完成了高级加密标准(AES)的FPGA电路设计,针对FPGA密码系统的DEMA攻击实验表明,通过电磁扫描找到最佳测量点,在42000个样本的条件下能成功破解AES密码电路的128 bit密钥。
為探究現場可編程門陣列(FPGA)密碼芯片運行時電磁輻射造成的涉密信息洩漏情況,研究瞭互補金屬氧化物半導體(CMOS)電路直接電磁輻射的原理,構建瞭FPGA密碼芯片的近場電磁輻射模型。根據這箇模型,探討瞭近場電磁輻射測量點的選取,採用電磁掃描的方法解決瞭電磁探頭在FPGA錶麵電磁信號採集的定位問題。此外,在闡釋瞭差分電磁分析(DEMA)攻擊原理的同時,完成瞭高級加密標準(AES)的FPGA電路設計,針對FPGA密碼繫統的DEMA攻擊實驗錶明,通過電磁掃描找到最佳測量點,在42000箇樣本的條件下能成功破解AES密碼電路的128 bit密鑰。
위탐구현장가편정문진렬(FPGA)밀마심편운행시전자복사조성적섭밀신식설루정황,연구료호보금속양화물반도체(CMOS)전로직접전자복사적원리,구건료FPGA밀마심편적근장전자복사모형。근거저개모형,탐토료근장전자복사측량점적선취,채용전자소묘적방법해결료전자탐두재FPGA표면전자신호채집적정위문제。차외,재천석료차분전자분석(DEMA)공격원리적동시,완성료고급가밀표준(AES)적FPGA전로설계,침대FPGA밀마계통적DEMA공격실험표명,통과전자소묘조도최가측량점,재42000개양본적조건하능성공파해AES밀마전로적128 bit밀약。
To do research for physical information leaked by Electromagnetic(EM)radiations from Field Programmable Gate Arrays(FPGA)cipher chip during its operation, this paper analyzes the principle of direct electromagnetic emanations for Com-plementary Metal-Oxide-Semiconductor(CMOS)circuit, and then a near-field leakage model about FPGA is designed. According to this model, the technique, EM scanning, is used to tackle the problem of the localization of the spatial position of the crypto-processor, in putting an electricmagnetic near-field sensor above the chip. Moreover, Advanced Encryption Standard(AES)circuit is completed based on FPGA cryptosystem and Differential ElectroMagnetic Analysis(DEMA)is introduced. As a result, practical experiment has shown that an attacker can extract the secret 128-bit key using 42000 traces of AES cryptographic device under the condition of having localized the optimal leaking spots characterized by mostly data-dependent EM emissions.