价值工程
價值工程
개치공정
Value Engineering
2015年
28期
35-36
,共2页
掏空行为%关联交易%国有控股上市公司
掏空行為%關聯交易%國有控股上市公司
도공행위%관련교역%국유공고상시공사
tunneling behavior%related party transactions%state holding listed companies
控股股东掏空行为给中小股东带来了沉重的伤害，也给我国证券监管部门带来了一系列的监管困难。那么从机制上如何抑制控股股东的掏空行为，就显得至关重要。本文选取了2010-2013年建筑行业的样本数据，针对控股股东掏空行为进行了相关分析，得出公司内部治理机制、外部环境可以一定程度上制约控股股东的掏空行为。
控股股東掏空行為給中小股東帶來瞭沉重的傷害，也給我國證券鑑管部門帶來瞭一繫列的鑑管睏難。那麽從機製上如何抑製控股股東的掏空行為，就顯得至關重要。本文選取瞭2010-2013年建築行業的樣本數據，針對控股股東掏空行為進行瞭相關分析，得齣公司內部治理機製、外部環境可以一定程度上製約控股股東的掏空行為。
공고고동도공행위급중소고동대래료침중적상해，야급아국증권감관부문대래료일계렬적감관곤난。나요종궤제상여하억제공고고동적도공행위，취현득지관중요。본문선취료2010-2013년건축행업적양본수거，침대공고고동도공행위진행료상관분석，득출공사내부치리궤제、외부배경가이일정정도상제약공고고동적도공행위。
The tunneling behavior of controlling shareholder has brought heavy damage to small and medium-sized shareholders, and also brought a series of regulatory difficulties for China's securities regulator. So to suppress the controlling shareholder's trunneling behavior from the mechanism is critical. This paper selected the sample data of the construction industry in 2010-2013, and analyzed the emptying behavior of controlling shareholders. It is concluded that the company's internal governance mechanism and the external environment can restrict the tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders to some extent.
